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Kemp-Roth and Saving 
In his triumphal appearance before Congress 
last week, President Reagan strongly reiter-
ated his support for the Kemp-Roth Bill, 
which would reduce Federal personal-
income tax rates by ten percent in each of  the 
nextthree years. Thus, it's worthwhile 
reviewing what the Administration hopes to 
achieve through this controversial measure. 
Under Kemp-Roth (according to this view), 
workers would work more hours at a more 
intense pace, because they would receive a 
higher after-tax return for working. More 
persons would enter the labor force, because 
jobs would have higher after-tax rewards. 
Unemployment would be lower, because 
businesses would find more profit in hiring 
and training unemployed workers. Govern-
ment spending to help the disadvantaged 
would contract, because the more pros-
perous economy wou  Id reduce the need for 
such spending. Business would invest more 
in job-generating capital, because of lower 
effective business-tax rates. Entrepreneurs 
would work harder, innovate more, and take 
greater risks, because such activities would 
mean higher after-tax returns. The rich would 
shift their wealth from unproductive tax 
shelters to productive uses. Finally, savers 
would save more, because they would 
receive a higher after-tax return to saving. 
Many Congressmen, businessmen and econ-
omists have rejected the Administration's 
claims, however. They do not bel ieve that 
workers wou  Id work much more, that the 
labor force would expand or unemployment 
contract substantially, that the need for 
government spending would fall much, that 
the morale of  entrepreneurs would improve 
much, that the rich would desert their tax 
shelters, or that savers wou  Id save much 
more. Indeed, one Congressman termed 
these claims "hallucinatory," whfle another 
Congressman asserted that he could not find 
a shred of evidence to support any of  these 
claims. 
Instead of analyzing all of these arguments in 
detail, we would do well to concentrate on 
the most controversial argument -that 
Kemp-Roth would raise saving. Keynesian 
theory, which has dominated the discussion 
and formulation of macroeconomic policy 
throughout most of  the past generation, posits 
that consumption is closely related to dispos-
able (after-tax) income, so that households 
spend a fraction of any additional disposable 
income they receive on consumption goods. 
Therefore, according to this theory, cutting 
personal income-tax rates raises disposable 
income and hence raises consumption. Pri-
vate saving also rises because households 
only consume a fraction of this increase in 
disposable income, but government saving 
(mi nus the government deficit) falls by the fu II 
amount of  the tax cut. Consequently, total 
national saving must fall unless the tax cut 
generates a massive boom-which concep-
tually could bring in enormous amounts of 
new tax revenue, reduce unemployment 
compensation and other income-sensitive 
transfer payments, and expand private 
saving. However, in a pure Keynesian model, 
it is theoretically impossible for the boom to 
be so massive. 
A few numbers might clarify this argument. 
Suppose that Kemp-Roth reduces taxes by 
$40 billion, and that households consume 90 
cents of each additional dollar of disposable 
income they receive. At the current level of 
national income, government saving would 
drop $40 billion, private saving would rise 
only $4 billion (40 x (1-.9)), arid national 
savingthus would drop by $36 billion. There-
fore, in the absence of a major increase in 
national income, Kemp-Roth would lower 
saving. 
In addition to raising disposable income, 
however, Kemp-Roth would.raise the real 
after-tax return to saving. The Administration 
argues that the latter effect, which tends to 
lower consumption, overshadows the former If~(dJ~Jf©1ll  IR2,~~~ffW~ 
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effect, which tends to raise consumption. A 
higher real after-tax return to saving would 
lower consumption because it makes all of 
the things for which households save-their 
retirements, rainy days, and their children's 
educations-more attractive relative to 
current consumption. 
Consider the case of a rich household that 
wishes to save for its retirement 30 years 
hence. If this household is in the 70-percent 
tax bracket and makes a nominal before-tax 
return of 15 percent, its nominal after-tax 
return is 4.5 percent (15 x (1-.7)). If it expects 
inflation to continue at the rate of 10 percent 
a year, its real after-tax return is -5.5 percent 
(4.5 - 10). Kemp-Roth would lower this 
household's marginal tax rate to 50 percent, 
thus raising its real after-tax return to -2.5 
percent. Without Kemp-Roth, assets lose 5.5 
percent of  their value each year, so that sacri-
ficing one unit of consumption now yields 
.18 (= (1-.055)30) units of retirement con-
sumption 30 years from now. But with Kemp-
Roth, that sacrifice yields .47 (= (1-.025)30) 
units of retirement consumption. This effect 
would be smaller, though still appreciable, 
for all but those households in the lowest tax 
brackets. Since Kemp-Roth would so mark-
edly improve the trade-off between current 
consumption and the future goals that saving 
accomplishes, saving should rise sharply. 
Which provides a better answer-the 
Administration view or  the Keynesian view of 
consumption and saving behavior? To an-
swer that question, we shou Id look at what 
happened after the last major reduction in 
Federal personal-tax rates, the 1964-65 Ken-
nedy tax cut. Since Kemp-Roth would take 
almost exactly the same form, the exercise 
should prove instructive. 
An estimated consumption-income relation-
ship (Keynes' "consumption function") 
based on pre-1964 data should fit the data 
very tightly and, more importantly, should 
predict what happened to consumption and 
saving after the tax cut. The relationship does 
indeed fit well in the 1954-63 period (see 
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chart). The solid line shows the actual evolu-
tion of consumption between 1954 and 
1967. The dotted line from 1954 to 1963 
shows the path of consumption implied by 
the fitted consumption function, given the 
actual path of disposable income. As the 
reader can see, the dotted line is right on top 
of  the solid line during the 1954-63 period-
a period with no change in the Federal per-
sonal-income tax code. 
The Kennedy tax cut passed in February 
1964. One can clearly see that no sudden 
surge in consumption occurred in 1964 or 
thereafter. Indeed, it would be impossible to 
pick out the year when the tax cut occurred 
just from looking at the consumption series. 
The dotted line labeled A shows how con-
sumption would have evolved ifthe 1954-63 
consumption function had continued to hold 
in the 1964-67 period. Here we can see that 
the previous consumption function no longer 
tracks actual consumption after the tax cut. 
Households consumed much less and saved 
much more than Keynesian theory would 
have predicted. The difference is probably 
due to the higher after-tax return to saving 
produced by the tax cut. 
The dotted line labeled B shows how con-
sumption would have evolved, had there 
been no tax cut in 1964. It is obtained by 
predicting what disposable income would 
have been without  the tax cut, and then usi ng 
the fitted consumption function to calculate 
what consumption would have been if  dis-
posable income had followed that predicted 
path. This shows that the tax cut actually 
lowered consumption. Since households 
saved more than 100 percent of the tax cut, 
national saving would have risen even if 
national income had not risen. But no one 
disputes that the Kennedy tax cut raised na-
tional income. Therefore, the tax cut raised 
national saving by a substantial amount. 
Our evidence impl ies that Keynesian 
consumption functions are not stable when 
tax rates change-specifically that the Kennedy tax cut lowered consumption and 
raised saving. Kemp-Roth, which would es-
sentially replicate this tax cut, therefore 
should also lower consumption and raise 
saving. Of  course, this kind of  prediction may 
be somewhat risky to make, because the U.S. 
economy has changed a great deal since 
1964, and may therefore respond differently 
to Kemp-Roth than to the Kennedy tax cut. 
For example, many of  the Administration's 
. critics have argued that households would 
not save the tax cut because the inflation rate 
is now about ten times higher than it was in 
1964. Even though this high inflation rate 
does depress the real after-tax return to saving 
and hence the level of saving, a reduction in 
personal income tax rates affects the tradeoff 
between current and future consumption in 




as when it is low. For this reason, the change 
in saving that Kemp-Roth would produce is 
likely to be in the same direction and com-
parable in magn itude to that produced by the 
Kennedy tax cut. 
The author concludes that, despite all the 
changes in the economy since 1964, the best 
available evidence supports the Administra-
tion's position that Kemp-Roth would raise 
saving. The critics who assert that there is not 
a shred of evidence to support this claim just 
have not looked for it. 
Paul Evans 
(The author, Assistant Professor of Economics 
at Stanford University, is the Visiting Scholar 
this semester at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
San Francisco.) 
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total # 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
~.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total # 
Individuals, part. &; corp. 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
7,932  5.7 
7,425  6.3 
2,077  6.0 
5,406  11.7 
- 1,719  - 7.0 
801  110.5 
31  0.5 
480  3.1 
- 1,624  - 3.7 
- 2,553  - 7.9 
4,604  17.4 
12,089  18.8 
12,123  21.9 
6,858  30.1 
Weekly Averages  Weekended  Weekended  Comparable. 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess ReserVes (+  )/Deficiency (  -) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (+  )/Net borrowed (  - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 





4/15/81  year-ago period 
n.a.  82 
40.0  148 
n.a.  66 
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